Introduction by Chris Elliott….
Having received a copy of the April 2024 Embargoed Newsletter, I decided to share this with CyprusScene worldwide readers as the Cyprob Issue is in full focus again and shows how the interlocutors trying to resolve the Cyprus dispute whilst Talking the Talk of an equitable settlement and satisfactory conclusion failed to Walk the Walk which allowed the Greek-controlled Republic of Cyprus ‘Government’ to gain EU membership and be acknowledged as representing the whole of Cyprus and for the Turkish Cypriots future to be embargoed.
Greetings to all Members and friends of Embargoed!
Welcome to the revamped edition of our Embargoed! newsletter! We’re excited to unveil our fresh new style and share the latest updates with you. You may have also noticed our brand-new website is now live, albeit pending some refinement. But that’s not all— there’s plenty more to discover, including details about our upcoming AGM and the Turkish Cypriot Cultural Festival. Dive in to learn more!
20 Years Since the Annan Plan
Apologies for the length, but the following is key to the situation today in Cyprus – and was actually the catalyst for the creation of our organization.
April 2024 marks 20 years since the last big push for the reunification of Cyprus; the United Nations sponsored ‘Annan Plan’, which took its name from the then Secretary General, Kofi Annan.
Background Dynamics
The Greek-controlled Republic of Cyprus ‘Government’ first began talks aimed at EU membership in 1998, however, their initial approaches were given the cold shoulder. The overwhelming preference by member states at that time was to avoid absorbing the ‘Cyprus Problem’ into the bloc.
All that changed when Greece became more active in pushing the accession of its Greek Cypriot kin. Having been pressured to remove their longstanding veto against the potential membership of Türkiye, Greece saw a chance to flip the balance of power by using their EU veto in a broader sense. This time as a means to advance the accession of Cyprus – which would remain under Greek Cypriot control, but act in the name of the entire island. The accession of Cyprus would provide a union of sorts with Greece and would oblige the EU to be firmly on the side of the Greek Cypriots, were they to become a member state.
Context and Negotiations: The Road to the UN Settlement Plan
It should be noted that the 1960 Cyprus constitution had considered and forbidden such an eventuality. In order to ensure that the balance of influence by Greece and Türkiyeremained equal, Cyprus was expressly forbidden from joining any union (political, economic, or otherwise) with any state or states, of which both Greece and Türkiye were not already a member. The EU therefore had a cast iron legal reason for rejecting the candidacy of Cyprus.
With the EU embarking on a phase of enlargement which was generally political (to secure the democratic principles of countries who had recently emerged from dictatorship) rather than the previous economic expansion, Greece indicated that it would indefinitely block the accession of the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary,Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and Malta, unless Cyprus joined too. The single-member veto which Greece had, until then, used against Türkiye, would instead be used to manoeuvre the EU against the Turkish Cypriots.
Rather than face-off with Greece, the EU Member states convinced themselves that they could leverage the situation to bring about a settlement in Cyprus. The carrot of EU membership would be offered to the Turkish Cypriot public in return for their positive vote to a settlement plan which was sure to require painful concessions on their part. Until this time, the consensus was that it was Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriots who were the cause of the island’s division. The thinking being that if they could be convinced, the Greek Cypriot vote would be a mere formality.
It was under these conditions that the UN presented their settlement plan which aimed atreunification of the 2 communities. Following extensive cross-border meetings and consultations, with Greece and Greek Cypriots on one side and with Türkiye and Turkish Cypriots on the other, it was agreed that any blanks (where agreement between the 2 communities was not made) would be filled in by the UN.
The resulting plan envisaged a federal republic of 2 partner states, which required the ceding of a significant amount of territory from Turkish Cypriots to Greek Cypriots (from 36.2% to 28.5%), a phased reduction in the number of Turkish and Greek mainland forces on the island (eventually leaving an equal, and only token number of each) and the opening of the Varosha/Maras region of North Cyprus, to be inhabited by Greek Cypriots.
To give the plan the best chance of success, the EU and UN sought and received assurances that the plan would be officially supported by both Cypriot Leaders (North and South of the border). Their support would be made plain throughout the run-up to a simultaneous referendum of the 2 communities. And to ensure that the moment was seized, the joint referendum would take place on 24th April 2004, precisely 1 week prior to Cyprus’ accession on 1st May.
Imbalanced Scenarios: Consequences of the Referendum Choices
The rules of this high-stakes game were starkly different for each side. Just like the Cyprus status quo today, it was anything but a level playing field. The following is a summary of the 4 potential outcomes which each community had to consider before placing their vote:
Both communities would join the EU in a new unified federal state.
The ‘Republic of Cyprus’ and ‘Turkish Cypriot Republic of Cyprus’ would cease to exist.
Greek Cypriots would join the EU as the Republic of Cyprus (representing the whole island).
Turkish Cypriots would not join the EU and would remain in an unrecognised state, subject to continued embargoes.
Greek Cypriots would join the EU as the Republic of Cyprus (representing the whole island).
Turkish Cypriots would not join the EU and would remain in an unrecognised state, subject to continued embargoes.
Greek Cypriots would join the EU as the Republic of Cyprus (representing the whole island).
Turkish Cypriots would not join the EU and would remain in an unrecognised state.
*In this last scenario it was intimated that the UN and EU would not go as far as recognising 2 separate (non-federated) states on the island. However, they would ensure that “the Turkish Cypriots would not be left out in the cold”.
Outcome Implications: The Promise and Reality of International Recognition
This was said as a means of encouraging and rewarding a Turkish Cypriot Yes, while simultaneously warning the Greek Cypriots that a No vote from their side would not be without consequences. If the Turkish Cypriots voted Yes, their international isolation – and the embargoes – would have to end.
Referendum Ramifications: Diverging Paths and Unforeseen Consequences
The result of the referendum was a resounding (76%) No (“Oxi”) from the Greek Cypriots and a majority (65%) Yes (“Evet”) from the Turkish Cypriots. Given the rules of the game the outcome was unsurprising.
For the Turkish Cypriots, their majority acceptance reflected a people who were desperate to remove the embargoes placed upon them. While acknowledging the painful concessions required and the inherent risk they were accepting, they saw a chance to take their place in the world; to travel, trade, share, interact and compete with the outside world as equals. It was a way to finally obtain their human rights.
For the Greek Cypriots, their overwhelming rejection reflected a state faced with the prosp
ect of losing their title of the ‘sole legitimate Government of Cyprus’, and in doing so, it would have spelled the end to their cherished dream to rule Cyprus as a Greek island. Their decision was further influenced by a tearful television address by the then President, Tassos Papadopoulos.
Tearful Tassos
Despite having promised the UN, US and EU that he would support the plan, instead he appeared on television on the eve of the referendum to beg his people to reject the deal with tears streaming down his face.
“I personally feel that I have been cheated by the government of the Republic of Cyprus”
Such was the turnaround in his attitude that the then EU Enlargement officer, Gunter Verhuegen, blasted the Greek Cypriot Administration for “cheating” its way into the Union. It was a rare and surprisingly strong departure from the usually tame nature of diplomatic language. He considered the about-turn by Papadopoulos to have been a personal betrayal too, proclaiming “I personally feel that I have been cheated by the government of the Republic of Cyprus”. On 26th April 2004 Verhuegen continued to rail against the Greek Cypriots when he complained that “A unique opportunity to bring about a solution to the long-lasting Cyprus issue has been missed…There is a shadow now over the accession of Cyprus.…What we will seriously consider now is finding a way to end the economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriots.”
In the days after Cyprus’ accession, we heard a flurry of announcements from world leaders promising the lifting of economic and cultural embargoes, the opening of the air and seaports, the agreement of a substantial aid package and the tacit recognition of the existence of Turkish Cyprus.
So, what changed?
In short, nothing. Unsurprisingly, all the initiatives detailed above have been blocked by EU Members, Greece and (Greek Cypriot controlled) ‘Cyprus’. And the EU has slowly but surely become another tool for Greece and the Greek Cypriots to use against the Turkish Cypriots.
It was a direct result of this betrayal by the UN and the EU which led to the birth of Embargoed! The embargoes against the Turkish Cypriots were cruel and unjust at their onset in March 1964. They became even more so after April 2004.
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This articled by Embargoed is so clear and yet mystifying why the Turkish Cypriots have failed to achieve the support that the EU and the UN had promised to give in 2004.
The strength of Greece & “ROC” is so far entrenched in the International instruments that TCs are living in a sea of despair. Has Türkiye failed to force the case for TCs’ basic human rights? I think the EU has never had any intentions of allowing Turkiye to join the EU.
The EU simply tagged them along. I followed this situation since the early 80s and sensed that the EU will never allow them to join. A more robust action must be taken.
I do not believe the EU want a more messy confrontation with Türkiye. Time to drive a more assertive position and action to allow TRNC to function on the international stage. Anything else is a sham and should not be tolerated any longer.
Thank you Mustafa.
We at Embargoed! agree that the the failure of the EU and UN to act on the promises of the Annan Plan and the double standards which they have employed since the onset of the embargoes in March 1964 are concerning.
For this reason, I think it’s clear that any future attempt at a solution cannot be open-ended (it must have a clear end date) and the Turkish Cypriots must see an end to the embargoes, whatever they decide.
To tie the end of embargoes to a Yes for whatever plan comes next is no less than blackmail.
İf the Powers that be really want to help the Turkish Cypriot people’s cause I AM sure they can find a way around the obstacles it may not be easy to find a solution so it may require some Creativity on their part for example freezing the Greek Cypriot membership because some İrregularities have been found in their application to the EU in addition bringing pressure to bear on the Greek Government to discourage them from using their veto against anything that would benefit the Turkish Cypriot people’s cause this would allow legislation to be passed without any İnterference from Greece or Greek Cyprus
Well said George….. Nothing Ventured Nothing Gained
Thank you, George.
The outside powers (the UN, the EU, the UK – and right behind them, the US) could point to why the 1969 constitution and recent UN resolutions have recognised that neither of the Cypriot communities has any right to rule over, speak for or act in the name of the other. They could further point to the fact that the application of Cyprus – by the Greek Cypriots only – was illegal. And finally, they could consider if it is right and just that one party in a dispute is allowed to dictate embargoes since 1964 against its partner – and why it is allowed to prevent the easing of those embargoes or any kind of aid.
There are none so blind, who willingly choose not to see.
İn a “Civilised Society” *JUSTİCE* is “FREELY GİVEN” No Vested İNTERESTS being Allowed to get in it’s way?
The less we want to Share is İNDİCATİVE of our lack of vision but not of our need to “CONTROL”